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The aim of this paper is to investigate the effects of airport’s profit sharing on the incentives to 
invest, market competition and social welfare. The analysis is developed under two frameworks, 
one with a single airport and one with two competing airports, and both with airline competition. 
We conclude that airport’s profit sharing may display the highest incentive to invest when 
compared to alternative vertical relations. Also, we found that airport’s profit sharing excludes 
the independent airline, as long as the profit airport participation is not below 60%. Moreover, 
airport’s profit sharing does not allow the elimination of double marginalization and thus the 
effects on social welfare are ambiguous. 
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1. Introduction 
The liberalization of the European air transport market, started in the end of 1980s/beginning of 
1990s, introduced radical changes in the sector. Geographic freedom of operations allowed by 
open skies agreements, entry of new airline companies, new business models (in particular the 
low cost carrier model inspired by the Southwest strategy), proliferation of airline alliances, 
consolidation of hub carriers and development of sophisticated prices strategies are some of the 
most significant. Another fundamental transformation, central to the theme of this paper, is the 
relationship between airports and airlines. Traditionally airports had substantial market power 
due to the natural monopoly features and this justified ex-ante regulation. However, market 
dynamics induced by liberalization led to the development of an oligopolistic market structure 
centered on hub and spoke networks.3 Consequently, air services’ supply become more 
concentrated and the airline’s market power was reinforced (Starkie, 2012). 
Under this context airports have to compete more intensely for airlines offering attractive prices 
and better services (Gillen, 2011; Copenhagen Economics, 2012). Moreover, most European 
airports are being run as modern business (Gillen, 2011; Bottasso and Conti, 2012). Long-term 
commercial contracts between airports and airlines,4 quite common in USA, are being intensively 
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3 For a characterization of hub and spoke networks see, for example, Spiller (1989), Oum et al. (1996), Zhang 
(1996) and Alderighi et al. (2005). 
4 See Starkie (2012) for a detailed description of the main features of the agreements between airports and airlines 
in several countries and Starkie (2008) for a typology of the more frequent agreements. 
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used also by European airports, introducing new vertical relations and changing the relative 
market power of firms. According to Fu et al. (2011), “vertical cooperation is likely to strengthen 
a carrier’s dominance at an airport”. The cooperation between airport and airlines is also related 
with the recent evolution on airports ownership.5 In the past, most airports had public ownership 
(central or regional). This continues to be a frequent situation in USA and Europe, although some 
important airports have been privatized. The London airports owned by BAA (British Airports 
Authority) were the first European case of privatization in 2006, followed by several other cases 
as Athens, Rome and Hamburg airports. The airlines’ participation in airports’ ownership 
introduces new dimensions in the airport-airlines relation. Fu et al. (2011), based on the work of 
Kuchinke and Sickman (2005), describe as follows a quite illustrative example of an airport-
airline agreement in the European market: 
“Terminal 2 of the Munich Airport was jointly funded by the airport operating company FMG (60%) and 
the Lufthansa (40%), the dominant airline at the airport. (…). Profits generated from the terminal, 
including those from leasing areas used for catering and retailing (…) are shared by FMG and Lufthansa.”   
Some other examples, not only from Europe but also from USA and Asia markets, reinforce the 
importance of investigating the effects of vertical cooperation. For instance, JetBlue invested in 
Terminal 5 of the New York JFK Airport obtaining in exchange the right to use the terminal 
under a 30-year lease agreement (Fu et al., 2011). Also, Lufthansa invested in Frankfurt Airport 
and holds a 29% share of Shanghai Airport cargo terminal (D’Alfonso and Nastasi, 2012). Latvia’s 
Riga Airport has offered a contract to the national airline Air Baltic to build and operate a 92 euro 
million per annum terminal (D’Alfonso and Nastasi, 2012).6  
Another crucial aspect in the vertical relation is the incentive to undertake investments. Airport’ 
investments in the improvement of infrastructure and services generate positive externalities to 
airlines when not all the benefits are included in the airport fares. This can happen because 
investment creates new value for passengers which increase final demand. With infrastructure 
investment airports can offer better services not only through the commercial retails concessions 
(attracting restaurants and others shops) but also by the provision of more efficient services (as 
car parking, connection to other public transports), more friendly infrastructures for passengers 
(with cultural entertainments, children playfields, rooms for religious services, etc.). In this way, 
airlines benefit from demand expansion without having to directly support all the costs of 
promoting the demand increase.7 
The main purpose of our work is to investigate the effects of airport’s profits sharing. Therefore, 
we build a model in which airports and airlines seek profit maximization8 and firms’ payoffs 
functions depend on the type of vertical relation between airports and airlines. We compare three 
types of vertical configuration: vertical separation, vertical collusion between the airport and the 
dominant airline (this case corresponds to the vertical integration structure that was the 
prevailing situation in Europe before liberalization) and partial airport’s profit sharing with the 
                                                        
5 For an updated survey on airports and airlines economics, covering airport privatization, see Zhang and Czerny 
(2012) and for a synthesis on the recent evolution on airport’s ownership and governance see Gillen (2011). 
6 In some other cases, airports offer special financial facility revenue bonds to finance specific investment 
programs, and these contracts allow airlines the right to exclusively use facilities. For instance, terminal E at 
Houston Airport was built for Continental Airlines. A similar agreement was signed between Dallas Love Field 
Airport and Southwest Airline, and Sidney Airport and Quantas Airlines (Fu et al., 2011). For additional 
examples of vertical agreements between low cost carriers and secondary airports see, for instance, Barbot (2009) 
and Fu et al. (2011). 
7 In fact, airports offer a bundle of services both to airlines and passengers. Some authors (Gillen (2011); Ivaldi et 
al. (2011) for instance) describe airports as platforms that bring together two different markets, the airlines’ 
market and the passengers’ market, applying the two-sided markets theory to understand airports’ activities and 
results. 
8 Our analysis does not apply to public owned airports that might pursue other objectives besides profit 
maximization. 
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dominant airline.9 The three types of vertical relation are compared considering separately 
airport investment and airport competition. When analyzing airport competition we consider 
that passengers evaluate differently the airports’ services not only because they have a different 
location from airports, and therefore they must bear transportation costs, but also because they 
evaluate differently other features of the airports as commercial and other complementary 
services. Therefore we use a model of horizontal differentiation  
From the analysis we conclude that airport’s profit sharing displays the highest incentive to 
invest when compared to alternative vertical relations, as long as the airline share is significant. 
Also, we found that airport’s profit sharing excludes the independent airline from the market (or 
from the airport involved in the agreement in the case of airport competition), when the airline 
share is not below 60%. Moreover, we conclude that airport’s profit sharing does not allow the 
elimination of double marginalization and thus the global effects on social welfare are 
ambiguous. Our main contribution is the identification of some crucial features of the vertical 
relations that should be considered by competition authorities or sectorial regulators when 
evaluating agreements between airports and airlines. 
The paper is organized as follows. After the introduction, section 2 presents a brief literature 
review on vertical relations in air transport market. Section 3 describes the model with one 
airport and two airlines. This model is developed in two versions: the first without airport 
investment (section 3.1) and the second with airport investment (section 3.2) Then, section 4 
discusses airport competition through the analysis of a model with two competing airports. 
Finally section 5 summarizes the main conclusions of the paper and enumerates directions for 
future research. 
2. Related literature 
Our investigation is closely related with the recent literature on the effects of different types of 
vertical restraints between airports and airlines in a context of airport competition, namely 
Starkie (2008), Fu et al. (2011), Barbot (2011), and D’Alfonso and Nastasi (2012). 
In the past few papers have examined airport competition analytically. This was understandable 
since airports were considered as natural local monopolies (Basso and Zhang, 2007). However, 
this situation changed rapidly, in particular due to market liberalization, commercialization 
innovations, low cost carriers’ strategies and the development of new transport networks, which 
motivated the development of research on airport competition. Furthermore, vertical relations in 
air transport sector have received growing attention from researchers in the last years. One of the 
first works on these topics was Gillen and Morrison (2003) who analyze the effects of vertical 
integration considering two pairs of firms in a context of product differentiation. Using a 
Hotelling model to incorporate airlines’ differentiation they conclude that vertical integration is 
both profit enhancing and social desirable due to the elimination of double mark-up. Also, Basso 
and Zhang (2007) analyze facilities competition focusing on congestion delays and compare the 
effects of monopoly and duopoly cases. In the same line of research, Basso (2008) investigates the 
impact of regulation on pricing and capacity decisions of congestible airports concluding that 
cooperation between airports and airlines allows some improvements regarding congestions but 
leads to downstream cartel. Barbot (2009) studied vertical agreements between one airport and 
one dominant airline when both firms face competition in their markets. Building both 
simultaneous and sequential games, Barbot (2009) concludes that airports and airlines prefer not 
to collude when they face symmetric conditions regarding services quality and costs. On the 
contrary, when airports and airlines have different market sizes or when they offer different 
service quality, vertical agreements may be attractive strategies. Furthermore, Zhang et al. (2010) 
analyze concession revenue sharing between one airport and its airlines. They conclude that the 
                                                        
9 We only consider aeronautical revenues. For a discussion of this topic see section 2. 
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effects on profits and on social welfare crucially depend on how airlines’ services are related to 
each other (complements, independent or substitutes) and also on the existence of airport 
competition. With a different approach to vertical contracts based on a transaction cost analysis, 
Fuhr and Beckers (2009) argue that vertical contracts increase social welfare due to lower 
coordination costs. 
As we mention above our work is closer to Starkie (2008), Fu et al. (2011), Barbot (2011) and 
D’Alfonso and Nastasi (2012). Starkie (2008) presents an overview of the airport-airline 
relationship, identifying the main features of different types of contracts. Fu et al. (2011) review 
several alternative forms of vertical relations, offering a detailed description of the relation 
between airports and signatory airlines, the contracts over airports facilities, the long term use 
contracts, the airport revenue bonds and the revenue sharing between airports and airlines. Fu et 
al. (2011) conclude that competition and welfare effects of vertical agreements depend on many 
factors and therefore a case by case analysis is necessary. Barbot (2011) analyze the effects of three 
types of vertical contracts previously characterized by Starkie (2008): the European case (which 
corresponds to vertical integration as the airport and the leader airline maximize their joint 
profits), the Australian case (where agreements lie in long term leases on terminals), and the USA 
case (where the signatory airline pays the airport the variable costs of its facility plus a part of its 
fixed costs). Barbot (2011) concludes that consumers may be better off with all the agreements but 
the European and the Australian cases have anti-competitive effects. Extending the analysis of 
Barbot (2011), D´Alfonso and Nastasi (2012) study the same three types of vertical contracts but 
in a context of airport competition. The authors develop a multistage game where each airport 
and its dominant airline choose the type of agreement and conclude that there are incentives to 
collusion, even under symmetric conditions, but this strategy has negative effects on social 
welfare due to the “misalignment between private and social incentives”. 
From the above mentioned literature emerges the conclusion that vertical relations have 
numerous effects on social welfare and competitiveness. Besides the well identified positive 
effects on consumer and social welfare resulting from the elimination of double marginalization, 
airport-airline agreements have many other advantages. Vertical agreements might allow 
airports to obtain financial support to undertake new investments as the long-term nature of the 
contracts provide security avoiding the hold-up problems (Starkie, 2008). Also, vertical 
agreements can secure business volume for airports thus reducing their risks (Starkie, 2012, 
D’Alfonso and Nastasi, 2012). Conversely, for airlines, vertical agreements can ensure the access 
to key airport facilities on favorable terms, which might reinforce their capacity to influence 
airport planning and operations including slot allocation (Fu et al, 2011). Additionally, vertical 
agreements allow both parts to benefit from the growing revenues from airport concessions and 
from positive demand externalities (D’Alfonso and Nastasi, 2012). Moreover, Fu et al. (2011) 
argue that vertical relation strengthen the hub status of major airports leading to increased 
employment and service quality.  
Nevertheless, vertical agreements may also have negative impacts. Airports may become more 
dependent on a small number of airlines which imposes restrictions on their strategies. 
Furthermore, vertical cooperation raises anticompetitive concerns for, at least, three motives. 
First, vertical agreements may harm competition in the downstream airline market, excluding 
independent airlines from the market (Starkie, 2012). Second, if dominant airlines obtain 
preferential treatment over key airport facilities their market power might increase and this 
imposes significant entry barriers, especially in congested airports (Fu et al., 2011, D’Alfonso and 
Nastasi, 2012). Third, when vertical agreements involve price discrimination between airlines, 
there are negative consequences for some market segments. Overall, as Fu et al. (2011) conclude 
there is no consensus on the optimal policy toward cooperation between airports and airlines and 
the advantages and drawbacks of vertical agreements must be evaluated with a case by case 
analysis. 
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An indispensable final note on vertical agreements concerns airports concession revenues. In 
several airports, commercial revenues have been growing faster than aeronautical revenues and 
in some major airports they already represent more than 50% of total airport revenues (Zhang et 
al., 2010). Additionally, airport’s profit sharing often happens with respect to revenues from 
concessions and not only to aeronautical revenues. The contract between FMG and Lufthansa 
mentioned on section 1 is an illustrative example of this situation. Therefore, a complete analysis 
on profit sharing should take into account concession revenues. In this paper we did not account 
for this feature in order to focus on other characteristics of the vertical relations but for future 
research this is an essential point. There is already research on the type of vertical relations 
considering concession revenues as, for instance, D’Alfonso and Nastasi (2012). Also, recently Fu 
and Zhang (2010) and Zhang et al. (2010) find that concession revenue sharing can be, under 
some restraints, welfare improving.  
3. The single airport model 
In this section we present the basic model to study the effects of airport profit sharing. We 
assume that airport A sells airport services to one leader airline L and to one follower airline F. 
The airlines offer a homogenous product to the passengers, the flight, and compete à la 
Stackelberg.10 According to Barbot (2011) and D’Alfonso and Nastasi (2012) the Stackelberg 
behavior is realistic to describe the oligopoly interaction in the air transport market as the 
dominant airline (typically the national flag company) chooses first the quantity and leave the 
remaining slots for the other carriers. 
In order to identify the main features of profit sharing agreement between airport and airlines we 
first characterize two extreme cases regarding vertical relations, vertical separation and vertical 
integration. Therefore, we build three versions of the model: first, we assume that there are no 
vertical relation and hence each firm behaves independently (vertical separation (VS) case); 
second, we assume that the airport and the leader airline collude (vertical integration (VI) case); 
third, we analyze a vertical agreement between the leader airline and the airport under which 
part of the airport’s profit belong to the leader airline (profit sharing (PS) case). Hence, under the 
third case, the leader airline maximizes an objective function that is the sum of its profits at the 
downstream market with a share of the airport’s profits. Conversely, the airport maximizes the 
remaining share of the upstream profits. 
The profit functions of each firm are represented as follows: 
Airline L:   LL qwp )(   
Airline F:   FF qwp )(   
Airport:11   )())(( ICqqcw FLA   
The traffic of the leader and the follower airlines are represented by qL and qF, respectively. p 
represents the final price that passengers pay to airlines and it is obtained from the inverse 
demand function that characterizes the passengers decisions, given by FL qqIap   . I 
stands for the investment undertaken by the airport. The effect of the investment on final demand 
depends on the parameter β (β>0) which represents the positive spillover from the investment. 
This representation of investment spillovers was inspired in Foros’ (2004) model on vertical 
                                                        
10 In a duopoly with Stackelberg competition the leader airline firstly decides the quantity that maximizes its 
payoff function and then, after observing the leader decision, the follower airline sets the quantity that to 
maximize its payoff function. 
11 Although concession service is an important source of airports’ revenue we do not consider it here in order to 
build a simple model that allows us to concentrate the attention on the investment spillover effects. 
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spillovers in the broadband market. The investment causes a demand expansion that benefits 
both airlines. The price w represents the aeronautical fare paid by the airlines to the airport, and 
we assume an equal value for both airlines. The parameters a and c stand for the demand size 
prior to the investment and the marginal cost of the airport activity, respectively. We assume a>c 
and also that any other costs of downstream activities are normalized to zero. Finally, C(I) is the 
investment cost function.  
The objective functions (or payoff functions) of each firm depend on the vertical relation. For the 
basic model developed in this section we have the following objective functions: 
Vertical separation: the payoff functions coincide with the profit functions, then  
LLVSA  , ; FFVSA  , ; AAVSA  , . 
Vertical collusion: the airport and the leader airline maximize the sum of their profits, hence their 
payoff function is )())(()(, ICqqcwqwp FLLALVIA   . The payoff function of the follower 
airline is equal to its profit function, FFVIA  , . 
Airport’s profit sharing: the leader airline payoff function is given by 
 )())(()(, ICqqcwqwp FLLLPSA    where δ represents the share of airport’s profit that 
belong to the leader airline, with )1,0( ; the payoff function of the follower airline is equal to 
its profit function, FFPSA  , , and the airport payoff function is 
 )())(()1(, ICqqcw FLAPSA   .12 
Moreover, we consider the following standard assumptions: i) the production of one unit of the 
final service by each airline requires one unit of airport services (fixed coefficients technology)13; 
ii) the quality of the service sold by the airport is the same whether it is sold to the leader airline 
or to the follower airline (thus, we are not studying sabotage14); iii) the final service of the airlines 
is homogenous; iv) there are no capacity constrains (thus, we do not study congestion issues). 
We describe the firms’ decisions as a sequential game with the following timing: at stage 1 the 
airport decides the investment. Then, at stage 2, the airport decides the aeronautical fare, w. At 
stage 3, the leader airline decides its quantity and at stage 4 the follower airline chooses its 
quantity.  
Furthermore, we assume that there is perfect information and we solve the game by backward 
induction to find subgame perfect Nash equilibria. We consider separately the three alternative 
vertical restraints. In order to have a benchmark we first solve the three models without 
considering the investment (section 3.1), and then we introduce the investment (section 3.2). 
                                                        
12 The superscripts of the payoff functions (that will also be used to represent the final results), indicate: i) the type 
of vertical relation (VS, VI or PS for vertical separation, vertical integration or profit sharing, respectively) and ii) 
the model (A, B or C for upstream monopoly without investment, upstream monopoly with investment and 
upstream duopoly, respectively). In model C we will add the subscripts 1 and 2 to indicate airport 1 and airport 2, 
respectively. 
13 Fixed coefficient technology is a standard assumption in this framework (see, for instance, Basso and Zhang 
(2007) and the references therein). Further, in footnote 8, Basso and Zhang (2007) present a simple explanation of 
this assumption when applied to the air transport sector.  
14 Sabotage refers to the upstream firm’ strategy of degrading the input quality sold to independent downstream 
firms in relation to the quality of the input sold to its subsidiaries. This strategy raises the downstream rival’s cost 
and benefits the vertically integrated firm. For a deep development of this topic applied to the 
telecommunications sector see, for instance, Weisman (1998), Sibley and Weisman (1998), Weisman and Kang 
(2001), and Chikhladze and Mandy (2009). 
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3.1 The single airport model without investment 
3.1.1. Vertical separation 
At the downstream market airlines decide the quantities à la Stackelberg. Then, the best reply 
function of the follower airline is given by ( , )
2 2
L
F L
qa w
q q w

  . The leader airline maximizes 
its profit when it produces ( )
2
L
a w
q w

 . Considering these quantities, the relevant demand 
function for the airport is given by 
3( )
( ) ( ) ( )
4
L F
a w
Q w q w q w

    and the aeronautical fare 
that maximizes the airport profit is 
2
VSA a cw

 . From here the standard equilibrium results 
under vertical separation are obtained: ,
4
VSA L a cq

 , ,
8
VSA F a cq

 , 
5 3
8
VSA a cp

 , 
2
, ( )
32
VSA L a c

 , 
2
, ( )
64
VSA F a c

 , 
2
, 3( )
16
VSA A a c

 , 
29( )
128
VSA a cCS

  and 
239( )
128
VSA a cW

 where CS is the consumer surplus and W is the social welfare defined as the 
sum of consumer surplus and firms profits.  
 
3.1.2 Vertical collusion 
Here we have the standard results of vertical integration: to maximize its payoff, the vertically 
integrated firm produces the monopoly quantity and foreclosures the independent firm: 
2
, caq LVIA

  and 0, FVIAq . The aeronautical fare and the final price for passengers coincide,
2
ca
pw VIAVIA

 , due to the elimination of double marginalization. This has positive effects on 
consumer surplus, as VSAVIA CS
ca
CS 


8
)( 2
, and on total profits as 
AVSAFVSALVSAALVIA ca ,,,
2
,
32
)(


  , and consequently, on social welfare. The main 
negative feature of vertical integration, deeply studied in industrial organization literature, is the 
effect on downstream competition, as the independent downstream is out of the market.15 
 
3.1.3 Partial airport’s profit sharing 
Considering the follower airline’s best reply function, the leader airline maximizes its payoff 
when it produces 
22
)(
cwwa
wqL



 . Then, the airport sets the aeronautical fare that 
maximizes its payoff function which yields 
)3(2
2)(3





cca
wPSA . By substitution backwards we 
obtain the equilibrium results:16
)3(4
)3)((,





ca
q LPSA , 
)3(8
)53)((,





ca
q FPSA , 
8
35 ca
pPSA

 , 
                                                        
15 For a detailed survey on foreclosure in vertical markets see Rey and Tirole (2007). In an application to air 
transport market Gillen and Morrison (2003) obtained the standard results of vertical integration. 
16 These results are obtained assuming that both airlines are active in the market, ie that δ < 0.6. Otherwise, the 
downstream market would be a monopoly. 
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2
22
,
)3(32
)42239()(





caLPSA ,  
2
22
,
)3(64
)35()(





caFPSA , 
)3(16
)1()(9 2,





caAPSA , 
128
)(9 2ca
CSPSA

 , 
128
)(39 2ca
W PSA

 . 
It is important to note that vertical separation is the particular case of airport’s profit sharing 
when δ=0. On the contrary, when δ=1, we do not obtain the vertical integration results in spite of 
the payoff functions being equal under both cases. This happens because the airport’s profits 
sharing case changes the relationship between airlines. If it was the upstream firm that stayed 
with part of the profit of one downstream firm then, at the downstream level, the interaction 
between the firms would not be modified. Under this case δ=1 would represent the vertical 
integration case. However, here it is one of the downstream firms that capture a share of the 
upstream profits. 
Comparing the results from the three types of vertical relation several conclusions emerge. 
First, it is important to notice that airport’s profit sharing foreclosures the follower airline from 
the market when δ ≥ 0.6. Hence, the anti-competitive effects of vertical integration can be 
achieved with a partial profit sharing.  
Second, airport’s profit sharing does not eliminate, nor even partially, double marginalization 
(Proposition 1). 
 
Proposition 1: With one airport and without infrastructure investment the final price under airport’s 
profit sharing does not depend on δ and it is equal to the final price under vertical separation for any 
positive share participation.17 
 
Hence, airport’s profit sharing does not improve consumer welfare comparing with the vertical 
separation case. We find this result quite surprising as we were expecting that airport’s profit 
sharing would produce intermediate results between vertical separation and vertical integration. 
What we verify, however, is that even for a very low share, the final price does not change. This 
happens because under airport’s profit sharing the leader airline and the airport decide 
independently in spite of  the proximity of their payoffs functions (that is, both firms desire to 
increase the upstream profits as it positively contributes to their payoffs). Only when firms 
decide in a perfect coordinated way, as it happens under vertical collusion, the double 
marginalization is eliminated. 
Third, as a consequence of the result synthesized in Proposition 1, we conclude that profit 
sharing does not change the total payoffs or social welfare in relation to the vertical separation 
case. The individual payoffs change (the leader’s payoff increases while the follower and airport’s 
payoff decrease), but the aggregate payoffs are the same as under vertical separation. 
Fourth, airport’s profit sharing changes the firm’s relative payoffs in relation to the vertical 
separation case. Under airport’s profit sharing the relative payoffs for each firm  
(
AFL
i
i


  with i = L, F, A) are the following:  
Leader airline: 
2
2
)3(15
)42239(2




L   Follower airline: 
2)3(15
35




F  
Airport: 
2)3(15
)1(12




A . 
                                                        
17 The proofs of all propositions are presented in Appendix A. 
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It is straightforward to verify that the relative payoff of the leader airline increases with δ while 
both relative payoffs of the other firms decrease with δ. What is happening is that airport’s profit 
sharing increases the aeronautical fare in relation to the vertical separation case, which increases 
the profits from the upstream activity and decreases the profits from the downstream activity. 
Then, the payoff of the follower airline decreases with δ. On the contrary, as the leader airline’s 
payoff not only includes profits from downstream activity but also from upstream activity, in 
spite of the lower downstream profits, the leader airlines’ payoff increases with δ due to the 
higher upstream profits. In this way, the leader airline can use the airport’s profit sharing as a 
strategy to reduce the follower airline payoff (or even to eliminate the rival from the market 
when the participation share is equal or above 60%) and to reduce the airport’s payoff. 
 
3.2 The single airport model with investment 
Now we consider that the airport undertakes investments to improve the quality of airport 
services. These investments increase the final demand and, consequently, have positive effects for 
the airlines (positive externalities).18 The cost of the investments is bear by the airport and is 
represented by the following cost function 
2
)(
2I
IC

  with φ > 0. For this function C’(I)>0 and 
C’’(I)>0 which ensures that it is not optimal for the airport to choose an infinite high level of 
investment in order to enhance passengers demand. Notice that the parameter φ represents the 
slope of the investment marginal cost, therefore an increase in investment leads to a strong 
increase in the investment cost. 
 
3.2.1 Vertical separation  
As the airlines decide the quantities à la Stackelberg the best reply function of the follower airline 
is given by 
22
),,(
L
LF qIwaIwqq 
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

. Taking into account this function, the leader airline 
maximizes its profit with
2
),(
Iwa
IwqL

 . Then, the airport decides the aeronautical fare in 
order to maximize its profit which yields 
2
)(
Ica
Iw

  and after the airport selects the optimal 
investment
238
)(3





ca
IVSB . In order to ensure that the optimal investment is always positive we 
consider assumption 1. 
 
Assumption 1: Let us assume that 2
8
3
  . 
 
Assumption 1 ensures that the slope of the marginal cost of the investment (φ) is high in relation 
to the unitary effect of the investment on demand growth (β). Otherwise it would be possible for 
the airport to choose a considerably high investment, in order to enhance demand, as the increase 
in the investment cost was relatively small comparing with the demand effect. 
With backward substitution, we obtain the following optimal values for the vertical separation 
case: 
                                                        
18 The expansionary investments made by the airport might also have negative effects for airlines, in particular, 
for incumbent airlines as higher airport capacity might allow the entry of new airlines. This is an important 
perspective, in particular for the evaluation of entry and competition in air transport markets. Nevertheless, here 
we do not address the negative effects of the airport infrastructure investments, as we intend to focus on the 
improvement on airports service quality and we do not discuss entry issues. 
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3.2.2 Vertical Collusion  
Under this case the leader airline and the airport maximize the sum of their profits after 
considering the best reply function of the follower airline, 
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L
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
, which 
yields the quantity 
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 . At stage 2 the leader/airport choose 
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  and, at 
stage 1, they choose the optimal investment
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IVIB . Assumption 1 ensures that the 
optimal investment is always positive.  
With backward substitution the equilibrium results are the following: 
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It is straight forward to verify that the investment does not change the standard effects of perfect 
collusion: i) vertical collusion eliminates double marginalization, which increases consumer 
surplus and firms profits (and, consequently, social welfare); ii) vertical collusion excludes the 
independent downstream firm from the business. 
 
3.2.3 Partial airport’s profit sharing 
Here the leader airline, after considering the best reply function of the follower airline, 
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2
)(
2
),(
 cwIwa
IwqL



 . At 
stage 2 the airport maximizes its payoff setting the aeronautical fare at 
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with 29)3(8  z . Once again, under assumption 1 the investment is positive. 
The optimal results are the following:19 
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19 As in the previous model, to obtain the values for prices, payoffs, consumer surplus and social welfare we 
assume that both airlines are active in the market, that is, δ < 0.6. 
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Notice that, as without investment and by the same reasons, the vertical separation results are the 
particular case of profit sharing when δ=0; however, when δ=1, the profit sharing case does not 
display the vertical integration results.  
 
3.2.4 Comparison of the equilibrium results 
Analyzing the equilibrium results of the three possibilities regarding the vertical relation we 
conclude the following. 
First, the leader airline can use profit sharing as a strategy to eliminate the rival airline from the 
market. This result is achieved as long as the share is equal or above 60%. This is exactly the same 
result we obtained without investment, and it has a crucial significance to competition policy. 
When evaluating firms’ strategies that encompass coordination, the regulatory authorities must 
give careful attention to the degree of coordination, as it is not necessary full integration to 
significantly reduce market competition. 
Second, comparing the investment equilibrium values we conclude that vertical integration leads 
to higher investment than vertical separation. This is not a surprising result: under vertical 
integration the leader firm is a monopolist and therefore it has a high incentive to invest in 
demand expansion. More interesting is to verify that profit sharing leads to greater investment 
than vertical integration, for high values of the profit share. This conclusion gives support to the 
frequent airline-airport agreements strongly justified on the incentives to invest in infrastructure 
improvements. Our model corroborates this argument as long as the agreements involve a 
significant participation on the airports profits. The above results are synthetize in the following 
proposition. 
 
Proposition 2: With one airport and investment, under assumption 1 the optimal investment values 
verify the following conditions: VSBVIBPSB III   for δ > 3/4 and VSBPSBVIB III   for δ < 3/4. 
 
As a consequence of the result synthetized on Proposition 2 it is very important to note that, at 
the equilibrium, the demand functions are different for each type of vertical relation due to the 
values of the equilibrium investment. Therefore, the appraisal of the three cases must be carefully 
done. When comparing the results we must take into account two effects: a demand effect due to 
the different demand function behind each case and a firms’ behavior effect caused by the 
different payoffs functions of each case. 
Third, the sum of firms’ payoffs under vertical integration is higher than under vertical 
separation. This is the expected result not only because with vertical integration there is a strong 
demand expansion (due to the higher investment) but also because vertical integration eliminates 
double marginalization which has positive consequences on aggregate profits. 
Additionally, the sum of firms’ payoffs under vertical integration is higher than under profit 
sharing. This is a quite interesting result since behind this comparison there are two effects on 
aggregate firm’s payoffs, the demand effect and the firms’ behavior effect, that, under some 
conditions, go in opposite directions. From proposition 2 we know that when the profit share is 
above ¾ the equilibrium investment is higher with profit sharing than with vertical integration. 
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Hence, under this constraint, there is a positive demand effect: the final demand is higher with 
profit sharing due to the greater investment and this increases aggregate profits. However, at the 
same time, there is also a second effect (the behavior effect) due to the different firms’ payoff 
functions. This second effect comes from the elimination of double marginalization that happens 
as a result of the coordination between the airport and the leader airline. The second effect is 
negative since profit sharing does not eliminate double marginalization and therefore, profits 
should be higher under vertical integration than under profit sharing. Moreover, we prove that 
the behavior effect always dominates the demand effect. Then, even when the demand effect is 
positive (ie, when δ > ¾), the total effect is negative and then profit sharing displays lower 
aggregate profits than vertical integration. When δ < ¾ both effects are negative, as profit sharing 
displays lower investment and does not eliminate double marginalization. All of these results are 
synthesized in Proposition 3. 
 
Proposition 3: With one airport and investment, under assumption 1 at the equilibrium the following 
conditions hold: 
AVSBFVSBLVSBAPSBFPSBLPSBALVIB ,,,,,,,


for all admissible values of δ. 
 
Proposition 3 can be better understood when we compare the aggregate payoff under profit 
sharing and vertical separation.20 Profit sharing leads to higher aggregate payoffs than vertical 
separation, but this effect is totally due to the demand effect, as the behavior effect is zero. This 
clearly proves that profit sharing does not allow any elimination of the double marginalization, 
even when the profit share is significant. 
Fourth, the leader airline and the airport have incentives to celebrate vertical agreements as long 
as the slope of the investment marginal cost function is not very high in relation to unitary effect 
of investment on demand increase. 
 
Proposition 4: With one airport and investment, under assumption 1 at the equilibrium the following 
condition holds: 
ALVIBAPSBLPSB 

,,,
if 2
2
2
523672
10912


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


 . 
 
This result highlights the attractive features of the vertical agreements between airlines and 
airports as, under certain conditions, the agreement lead to higher profits than the full 
coordination of activities achieved with vertical integration. This positive effect of vertical 
agreements on the profits is due to the positive effect on the investment, and through it, on 
demand expansion. 
Fifth, the follower airline loses with vertical agreement. This is the expected result since the most 
desirable situation for the follower airline is vertical separation, because there is a level playing 
field in the downstream market. Under vertical integration or profit sharing with δ ≥ 0.6 the 
follower airline is out of the market; under profit sharing with δ <0.6 the follower airline has 
positive profits but quite below what it would obtain under vertical separation. Notice that these 
are exactly the conclusion we obtained without considering investment. 
 
Proposition 5: With one airport and investment, under assumption 1 the following conditions hold: 
0222 
VIBPSBVSB
 . 
 
Sixth, the vertical agreement can also be the best vertical relation for consumers, depending on 
the parameters values. When δ < 3/5 consumer surplus is higher with vertical integration than 
                                                        
20 The detailed comparison is described in the proof of Proposition 3 in the Appendix A. 
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with profit sharing. On the contrary, when, δ > 3/5 profit sharing benefit consumers as long as 
the slope of the investment marginal cost function is not too high in relation to the unitary effect 
of investment on demand. This result is explained by the relative increase in demand caused by 
the investment. 
 
Proposition 6: With one airport and investment, under assumption 1 at the equilibrium the following 
conditions regarding consumer welfare hold: 
VSBPSBVIB
CSCSCS  if 
5
3
 . Otherwise, 
VSBVIBPSB
CSCSCS  for 2
)3(2
3





 . 
 
Finally, regarding social welfare we verify that vertical integration is better off than vertical 
separation. Nonetheless under profit sharing it is possible to have better or worse results than the 
ones obtained under vertical integration (that is 
VIBPSB
WW   and 
PSBVIB
WW  ), depending on the 
particular values of the parameters β, φ and δ. 
 
3.3 Conclusions from the models with one airport 
Overall, from the models with a single airport we conclude that the investment does not change 
the possibility of foreclosure. The follower airline is excluded from the market when vertical 
agreements occur, as long as the airport’s profit share of the leader airline is equal or higher than 
0.6. Also, the investment does not change the conclusion regarding double marginalization: 
vertical agreements do not eliminate double marginalization even for a large profit share. 
Nevertheless, the model with investment allows the identification of several important properties 
for the vertical agreements analysis. Vertical agreements are the vertical relation that creates the 
highest incentive to invest in airport infrastructures and this strategy is attractive to the 
consortium leader airline/airport as long as the investment costs are not excessively high. 
The follower airline is the economic agent that loses with the vertical agreements, while from 
consumers’ and social welfare perspectives the final effects depend on the particular feature of 
the markets. It is possibly to find situations where consumer surplus and social welfare reach the 
highest values with vertical agreements but it is also possible that the best vertical arrangement is 
vertical integration. These results are explained by the trade-off between two contradictory 
effects. For one side, vertical agreements lead to the highest demand expansion, which is positive 
for consumer surplus and social welfare. Nonetheless, on the other side, vertical agreements do 
not eliminate, even partially, the double marginalization while vertical integration achieved this 
goal. Summing up, when evaluating vertical agreements, the competition authorities must take 
into consideration all of these effects and their relative weight in each particular case under 
evaluation.  
4. The model with airport competition 
In this section we analyze how airport competition changes the effects of vertical agreements on 
competition and social welfare. We consider two airports, A1 and A2, which offer imperfect 
substitutes services. The imperfect substitutability is not only due to the different location of 
passengers and airports (which imply travelling cost for the passengers) but also results from 
other airport’s characteristics, such as the attributes of commercial facilities (shops, restaurants, 
etc), the quality of complementary services (car parking, children’s facilities, public 
transportation to city center, etc) and the global quality of the airport services that passengers 
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evaluate differently.21 To take account of these features we use a horizontal differentiation model 
with the following inverse demand functions: 211 QQap   and 122 QQap   with 
)1,0( , where pi (with i = 1,2) is the final price paid by the passengers to the airlines when they 
fly from airport Ai; Qi is the total traffic of airport Ai and θ is the parameter that captures the 
degree of substitutability between airport services. Notice that if θ = 1 the passengers would 
consider the services of the two airports as perfect substitutes while if θ = 0 the passengers would 
see the airport services as independent products. Therefore, we assume 0<θ<1. Values of θ closer 
to zero represent deeper differentiation between airports’ services.22,23 
The downstream market consists of two airlines, the leader and the follower, that offer a 
homogenous product (the flight) and compete in each airport à la Stackelberg. We assume that 
both airlines can operate at both airports. This assumption is supported by several examples 
where the same airlines simultaneously operate at airports that compete directly, as it happens 
for instance, between the airports of Barcelona and Madrid, or between Brussels and Amsterdam 
(D´Alfonso and Nastasi, 2012). Barbot (2009) and D´Alfonso and Nastasi (2012) argue that airport 
competition also happens between airports located in the same metropolitan area as for instance, 
London or Rome airports. Moreover, when we take into account non-network air services, as the 
ones operated by charter and low cost carriers, the cost of switching all or part of the operations 
between airports is not impeditive of traffic reallocation (Starkie, 2002).24  
Given the structure of the downstream market the total demand for airports 1 and 2 are, 
respectively, FL qqQ 111   and 
FL qqQ 222  , where 
h
iq  stands for the quantity of airline h (with  
h = L or F) operated at airport i (i = 1, 2). 
We develop a framework with the following sequence of decisions. At stage 1 the airports decide 
simultaneously the aeronautical fares (w1 and w2); at stage 2 the leader airline set simultaneously 
the quantities for each airport ( Lq1  and 
Lq2 ); at stage 3 the follower airline decide simultaneously 
the quantities for each airport ( Fq1  and 
Fq2 ). All the other standard assumptions of the basic 
model hold. 
With the above assumptions we build three models to capture the three possibilities regarding 
the vertical relation: vertical separation (VS), vertical integration (VI) and profit sharing 
agreement (PS).  
 
4.1 Vertical separation 
Under this case the payoff function of each firm coincide with the corresponding profit function. 
Hence, the follower airline’s payoff function is: 
FFLFLFFLFLF qwqqqqaqwqqqqa 221122112211 )()(   . 
The best reply functions for the follower airline in each airport are given by: 
                                                        
21 Notice that we only analyze horizontal differentiation between airports. We are not considering situations 
where all passengers evaluate in the same way the quality differences.  
22 The above inverse demand functions were obtained from an utility function analogous to Dixit (1979). For more 
details see appendix B. Basso (2008) also uses a similar approach to incorporate horizontal differentiation between 
airlines’ services.  
23 The spatial Hotelling model is an alternative framework to study horizontal product differentiation. With a 
wider interpretation of the transportation cost it is possible to include in the Hotelling model all the other features 
of the horizontal product differentiation, and not only the geographic location. With an infinite linear city version 
of the Hotelling model (as the one used by Basso and Zhang (2007) and D’Alfonso and Nastasi (2012), for 
instance) we obtained similar inverse demand functions to the ones we present above. 
24 There are, however, many real situations where airlines are bounded to a certain airport. This is particular 
important to scheduled carriers with high level of hub and spoke traffic, that benefit from agglomeration 
economies and hence have high cost of switching airports (Starkie, 2002).  
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The leader airline’s profit function is: 
LFLFLLFLFLL qwqqqqaqwqqqqa 221122112211 )()(   . 
Taking in account the best reply functions of the follower airline of each airport, the leader airline 
maximizes the profit when it produces 
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wwqL . Anticipating these quantities, the airports set simultaneously the 
aeronautical fares that maximizes their individual profit functions given by ))(( 111
1 FLA qqcw   
and ))(( 222
2 FLA qqcw  . The optimal aeronautical fares are 
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that both airports set the same fare as they face identical market conditions. 
By backward substitution we obtain the optimal results under vertical separation that are 
described at Appendix C1. 
As expected, the prices (both the passengers’ prices and the aeronautical fares) are lower with 
airport competition than with a single airport (note that VSAVSCVSC www  21  and 
VSAVSCVSC ppp  21 ), and decreasing with θ, that is, deeper differentiation implies higher optimal 
prices. Also, airport competition brings higher social welfare (note that VSAVSC WW  ). 
 
4.2 Vertical collusion 
Vertical collusion is characterized by perfect coordination between airport 1 and the leader 
airline.25 By contrast, airport 2 and the follower airline maintain the individual behavior.  
The follower’s airline best reply functions are the same as under vertical separation, while the 
payoff function of the leader airline/airport 1 is given by 
))(()()( 111221122112211
1 FLLFLFLLFLFLAL qqcwqwqqqqaqwqqqqa    . 
The quantities that maximize the above payoff function are 
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When simultaneously choosing the aeronautical fares, airport 1 decides considering 1AL and 
airport 2 maximizes its profit function. The optimal aeronautical fares are 
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Comparing with vertical separation we conclude that both airports set a lower fare and that the 
airport’s 2 fare reduction is deeper. This is a quite interesting result. As a response to vertical 
collusion airport 2 follows a more aggressive price policy in order to protect its market position. 
Even though, airport 2 loses traffic and market share in relation to the vertical separation case. 
                                                        
25 According to Barbot (2009) “agreements become more plausible when an airline dominates an airport and so 
has a large market share there.” 
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Substituting backwards we obtain the optimal results under vertical collusion which are 
described at Appendix C2. 
As noted previously, the aeronautical fare at airport 1 is higher than at airport 2 and sufficiently 
high to exclude the follower airline from airport 1 (note that VICVICVSCVSC wwww 2121  ). 
Furthermore, the follower airline expands operations at airport 2, when comparing with the 
vertical separation case, although this increase does not compensate the reduction on its total 
traffic. As expected, the leader airline increases operations at airport 1 and decreases at airport 2 
and, globally, expands its activity. Concerning the airport’s operations we verify that airport 2 
loses traffic both in relation to vertical separation and to the competitor airport, while the 
opposite happens to airport 1. 
Regarding the final prices for passengers, we verify that  airport’s 1 price falls, partially 
eliminating the double marginalization. The elimination of double marginalization is not 
complete (note that VSCVSC wp 11  ) due to product differentiation that gives additional market 
power to firms. The price at airport 2 is higher than at airport 1, and this is not a surprising result 
as airport 2 is not vertically integrated. Nevertheless, at airport 2 there is also a price decrease in 
relation to vertical separation. Then, although airport 2 is not vertically integrated, the passengers 
that depart from airport 2 benefit for the vertical integration in airport 1 due to market connection 
through the airlines’ activities. Concerning the follower airline there is another interesting result: 
the unit margin under vertical integration ( VSCVSC wp 22  ) increases in spite of the lower final price. 
This is due to the decrease in airport’s 2 fares which is the response of airport 2 to vertical 
integration of its competitor. However, these changes do not avoid the decrease of the follower’s 
airline and airport’s 2 profits. 
Comparing the payoffs we observe that there is an incentive for vertical collusion since the 
integrated firm’s payoff is higher than the sum of profits of the airport 1 and the leader airline 
under vertical separation. On the contrary, the left alone firms are worse-off. 
Evaluating the consumer welfare we conclude that passengers from airport 2 lose with vertical 
integration. Although they pay a lower price, the reduction of traffic causes a decrease on 
consumer surplus. Differently, consumers that depart form airport 1 have higher surplus as there 
is both price reduction and traffic increase. Overall, the effect of vertical integration on consumer 
surplus is positive since the effect on airport’s 1 passengers is stronger. 
Finally, social welfare is higher under vertical integration than under vertical separation, which is 
the standard result of vertical integration. 
 
4.3 Partial airport’s profit sharing 
Under this case the leader airline obtains part of the airport’s 1 profit. Then, the best reply 
functions of the follower airline are identical to the ones obtained above. Knowing the best reply 
functions, the leader airline set the quantities considering the following payoff function 
 ))(()()( 111222111 FLLLL qqcwqwpqwp   . 
The leader airline maximizes its profit with 
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Taking into account the above quantities, the airports set simultaneously the aeronautical fares, 
maximizing their payoff functions given by   ))(()1( 1111 FLA qqcw      and   
))(( 222
2 FLA qqcw  , respectively. 
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The optimal aeronautical fares are 
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Comparing with the aeronautical fares obtained under vertical separation and vertical collusion 
we conclude that profit sharing leads to the highest fare at airport 1. This is a strong effect of the 
vertical agreement explained by the fact that the leader airline/airport 1 wish to exclude the 
follower airline from airport 1 or, if that is too costly, they prefer to extract the highest possible 
upstream profit from the follower airline activities at airport 1. This result is synthetized by 
Proposition 7. 
 
Proposition 7: With airport competition, profit sharing agreements between the leader airline and airport 
1 lead to the highest aeronautical fare at airport 1, ie VICVSCPSC www
111
 . 
 
On the contrary, airport 2 sets the same aeronautical fare as under vertical separation.  
Substituting backwards the optimal quantities are 
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The follower airline’s quantity at airport 1 is decreasing with δ and for δ ≥ 0.6 this airline is 
excluded from airport 1. This is a similar result from the previous model. Hence, profit sharing 
agreements have a strong capacity to exclude rivals from the market, and this capacity is not 
affected by airport competition.  
 
Proposition 8: With airport competition, vertical agreements between the airport 1 and the leader airline 
exclude the follower airline from this airport as long as δ ≥ 0.6. 
 
At airport 2 the follower’s airline traffic has intermediate values between vertical separation and 
vertical integration case, that is, FVICFPSCFVSC qqq ,,,
222
 . 
Moreover, in respect to the leader’s airline traffic, profit sharing amplifies the effects of vertical 
integration, that is, the leader’s traffic at airport 1 is the uppermost and at airport 2 is the 
lowermost in comparison with the other two alternative vertical relations, as long as the profit 
share is relatively high. Then, for significant values of δ, which also ensure that the follower 
airline does not have any operations at airport 1, the leader airline reinforces its position at 
airport 1 and disinvest at airport 2, even more than under vertical integration. This creates a 
deeper gap between the integrated airline/airport and the non-integrated airline and airport. 
 
Proposition 9: With airport competition and profit sharing, the leader airline has the highest traffic at 
airport 1 and the lowest traffic at airport 2 as long as 
2
2
29
39





 . 
 
It is also interesting to notice that profit sharing does not change the total traffic at each airport in 
relation to the vertical separation case, as long as δ < 0.6. With profit sharing the follower airline 
reduces (increases) its operations at airport 1 (2) and the leader airline adjustments have the 
opposite sign. Then, overall each airport has the same traffic as under vertical separation. By 
contrast, when δ ≥ 0.6 the traffic at airport 1 is lower under profit sharing than under vertical 
separation. 
Regarding the remaining optimal values we distingue two situations according to the follower’s 
operations at airport 1. First, we analyze the results when the follower’s airline offers services at 
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airport 1, which occurs when δ < 0.6. Second, we study the results when the follower’s airline is 
excluded from airport 1, which happens when δ ≥ 0.6 . 
 
4.4 First case: The follower airline is not excluded from airport 1 
When the follower airline operates at airport 1 the optimal values of the prices, firms’ payoff, 
consumer surplus and social welfare are described in Appendix C.  
The final prices are exactly the same as under vertical separation. This is an important result as it 
means that vertical agreements, as long as the follower airline is not excluded from airport 1, do 
not have any effects on the passengers’ prices. That is, profit sharing does not allow any 
reduction of the double margin, in spite of the partial common interests of one airport and one 
airline. This is exactly the same result we obtained with a single airport. Therefore this result is 
quite robust and is not affected by airport competition. 
Consequently, also consumer surplus and social welfare are the same as under vertical 
separation. Therefore, when the follower airline maintains activities at airport 1, profit sharing 
with airport competition have no aggregate effects in relation to vertical separation. There are 
individual effects, since the relative firms’ payoffs change, but globally they cancelled out each 
other. 
 
Proposition 10: With airport competition and when the follower airline is not excluded from airport 1, 
profit sharing agreements do not have any effect on passengers’ price, consumer surplus, aggregate payoffs 
or social welfare comparing with the vertical separation case. 
 
4.5 Second case: The follower airline is excluded from airport 1 
The follower airline is excluded from airport 1 when δ ≥ 0.6. Under this restraint the passengers’ 
price is higher at airport 2 than at airport 1. The follower airline obtains lower profits when it has 
activity at both airports and, on the contrary, the leader airline has higher profits as long as 



4
35 
 . Additionally, consumer surplus is higher with the exclusion of the follower airline. 
Social welfare can be higher or lower than under vertical integration depending on the 
parameters. 
 
4.6 Conclusions from the models with airport competition 
From the comparison of the three vertical relations cases we reach the following conclusions. 
First, profit sharing excludes the follower airline from the airport that cooperates with the leader 
airline when the profit share is equal or above 0.6. This is the same result we obtained with a 
single airport. Therefore, we conclude that profit sharing has a strong capacity of foreclosure the 
rival airline, and this feature is independent of the existence of infrastructure investments or 
airport competition. 
Second, with profit sharing airport 1 charges the highest aeronautical fare, making the follower 
airline presence at this airport quite difficult. Also, as long as the share in profits is significant, the 
leader/airport 1 expand their activities in airport 1 and diminish at airport 2. 
Third, when profit sharing does not exclude the follower airline from airport 1 the vertical 
agreement does not have consequences on consumer surplus or social welfare compared with 
vertical separation. This is an important result for the appraisal of vertical agreements as it points 
out that when there are no damages on downstream competition there are also no negative 
effects on social welfare. Under these circumstances the evaluation of vertical agreements must 
focus on the firms’ relative gains and losses. Quite different results emerge when profit sharing 
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excludes the follower airline from airport 1. The negative effects on downstream market 
competition must be opposed with the positive effects on consumer surplus (due to the traffic 
expansion at airport 1) and with the effects on social welfare, which can be positive or negative 
depending on the particular markets features represented by the models’ parameters. 
Fourth, profit sharing does not eliminate the double marginalization. 
5. Conclusions 
We investigate the effects of airport’s profit sharing on investment incentives, competition and 
social welfare. We compare three different market configurations regarding vertical relations 
between airports and airlines: two extreme cases, vertical separation and vertical integration, and 
the partial participation of the dominant airline on airport profits. 
We conclude that airport’s profit sharing displays the highest incentive to invest when compared 
to alternative vertical relations, as long as the airline share is significant. This is an interesting 
result which gives support the frequent justification for vertical agreements based on the 
incentives to enhance infrastructure investments. 
Also, we conclude that airport’s profit sharing excludes the independent airline from the market 
(or from the airport involved in the agreement in the case of airport competition) when the 
participation is not below 60%. This is a quite robust result that does not change with airport’s 
investment or airports competition. This result is explained essentially by the fact that profit 
sharing does not eliminate double marginalization, even when the airline share in the airport 
profit is very high. This is an important outcome that policy authorities should take into account 
when evaluating vertical agreements between airports and airlines. 
Moreover, we conclude that the effects of airport’s profit sharing on social welfare when the 
independent airline is excluded from the market are ambiguous and depend on the specific 
features of the markets. For one side double marginalization persists but from other side there are 
positive effects caused by higher investment or by airport competition. Only when the 
independent airline is not excluded from the market and when there is airport competition the 
negative effects of vertical agreements on social welfare do not appear for sure.  
Overall, we conclude that airport’s profit sharing with a dominant airline should be carefully 
scrutinized by competition authorities in order to avoid undesired effects on investment and on 
social welfare. Our conclusions support the argument of Fu et al.(2011) that “competition and 
welfare effects of vertical arrangements depend on many factors including the market structures 
in the airline/airport markets. (…) There is a need to evaluate the costs and benefits of such 
airport-airline alliances on a case by-case basis”. Our work contributes to the identification of 
some issues that must be taken into account on this evaluation. 
The results of our work depend on several simplifications necessary to build theoretical models. 
Although the simplifications abstract from important real world features, the models provide 
useful insights as they highlight some crucial relations. Even though there are several aspects that 
worth to be considered in future research. Airport’s revenues from commercial concessions are 
one of these points and its consideration might bring new perspectives on the effects of vertical 
linkages between airports and airlines. Another important topic is the airport competition 
between private and public airport, in line of research already developed by Basso (2008). 
Additionally, negative externalities from airports investments also deserve a detailed analysis, 
linked with the effects of airport congestion on the incentives to celebrate vertical agreements.  
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Appendix A– Proof of the propositions 
Proposition 1: Note that 
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Proposition 2: From direct comparison of the expressions we conclude that 
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Proposition 3: Considering the optimal values we quantify three comparisons of the payoffs’ 
sums. First we compare VI with VS; second we compare PS with VI, and finally, we compare PS 
with VS. 
 
A.1. Payoffs’ sum under VI and VS 
Comparing the corresponding expressions we conclude that 
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caAVSBFVSBLVSBALVIB  for all admissible values of the 
parameters. In order to separate the demand effect from the firms’ behavior effect we identify the 
firms’ payoffs that would exist if firms maximize the same payoff functions as under vertical 
separation, but considering the demand function of the vertical integration case. We denominate 
this artificial situation by X. Then, considering 
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caAX . The difference between the sum of payoffs in situation X and the 
vertical separation equilibrium is the demand effect, as we are comparing two situations with 
different demand but the same payoffs functions. The difference between the vertical integration 
equilibrium and the situation X is the behavior effect, as we are comparing two situations with 
the same demand but different firms’ payoff functions: 
Demand effect = 
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Firms’ behavior effect = 0
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of the parameters. 
 
A.2. Payoffs’ sum under PS and VI 
Considering the optimal values we also conclude that 
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admissible values of the parameters. In order to separate the demand effect from the firms’ 
behavior effect we identify the payoffs that would exist if firms maximize the payoff functions of 
the profit sharing case but considering the demand function of the vertical integration case. We 
denominate this artificial situation by Y. Then, considering 
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between the sum of payoffs of profit sharing and of situation Y is the demand effect. The 
difference between the payoffs of situation Y and of profit sharing is the behavior effect: 
Demand effect = 
 
0
)2((16
))(34()6027()11248(
)()(
2
2222
,,,,,, 





z
caAYFYLYAPSBFPSBLPSB  
for δ > 3/4.  
Firms’ behavior effect = 0
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of the parameters. 
 
A.3 Payoffs’ sum under PS and VS 
Considering the payoffs’ sum under profit sharing and vertical separation at the equilibrium, we 
conclude that 
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all admissible values of the parameters. To separate the two effects we characterize the situation 
Z where firms maximize the payoff functions of vertical separation with the demand function of 
the profit sharing case. For situation Z we have 
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Hence, when we compare profit sharing and vertical separation under the same demand function 
we obtain the same total payoffs. Then, we conclude that profit sharing does not allow any 
elimination of double marginalization as the difference in total payoff is only due to the demand 
effect. 
Proposition 4: From direct comparison of the payoffs the condition of proposition 4 is obtained. 
Proposition 5: From direct comparison of the payoffs the conditions of proposition 5 are 
obtained. 
Proposition 6: From direct comparison of the payoffs the conditions of proposition 6 are 
obtained. 
Proposition 7: From direct comparison of the payoffs the conditions of proposition 6 are 
obtained. 
Proposition 8: Note that 01 
PSBq  if δ ≥ 0. 
Proposition 9: From direct comparison of the expressions we conclude that LVSCLVICLPSC qqq ,,,
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for any admissible value of θ. 
Proposition 10: From direct comparison of the optimal values the conclusions of Proposition 10 
are obtained. 
Appendix B – Demand function with product differentiation 
We assume that the representative consumer has the following quadratic utility function similar 
to Dixit (1979): 
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The maximization of the consumer utility function subject to the budget constraint leads to the 
demand functions: 
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These demand functions clearly represent that the number of passengers that fly from airport A1 
(A2) decreases in p1 (p2) and increases, by a lower proportion, in p2 (p1), as a consequence of 
imperfect substitution. 
Appendix C – Optimal results for the model with airport competition 
C1. Vertical separation 
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C2. Vertical collusion 
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C3. Profit sharing when the follower airline is not excluded from airport 1 
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